of
Henderson County, Kentucky
GEORGE WASHINGTON BICENTENNIAL INFOLINE
June 1999
With the surrender of Cornwallis in October, 1781, most of the hostilities of the Revolutionary War had come to an end. While fighting continued in various locales, no major battles were to be fought. In this atmosphere, the new nation could look towards an era of peace. Unfortunately for the revolutionary soldiers, the anticipated peace also allowed Congress and the individual state legislatures to look past the needs of the Continental Army. Wartime promises to pay bounties and to provide military pensions to brave patriots who had borne the burden of the war were ignored by the many legislatures who struggled to make ends meet.
As
the main reason for unification faded into the background, the states were
becoming increasingly indifferent to the pull of the Continental Congress
and pleas for unified efforts, including the payment of war debts.
At
Washington's urging, the Congress did appropriate eight million dollars
for the next campaign; but this was barely enough to keep a skeleton army
intact. Washington pleaded with various governors of the individual
states to send money to Congress, but not enough money was collected to
even pay the interest on the outstanding debts.
The situation was perilous, men who had given so much were in jeopardy of not being paid and of losing what possessions they had. Patriots who had given goods and money to the cause were at risk of going bankrupt as were the financiers who had secured loans for the struggling nation. The officers began to seriously think of taking matters into their own hands --now while they were organized and armed! It was clear to many of them that force was necessary to compel the Congress to enact a system whereby the states would agree to repay these debts. They would have to march to Philadelphia, themselves.
As the urgency of the situation increased, Alexander Hamilton, a former aide to Washington and now a congressman from New York, wrote Washington a letter in mid-February of 1783, to apprise him of the situation. Hamilton stated that he felt there was no further possibility for extracting payments from the various states to cover the costs of the military and he believed the army would use force to "procure Justice" for themselves. Hamilton argued that left on their own, these soldiers might take action without regard to Washington and might even act outside of the bounds of moderation--i.e. civil unrest. However, Hamilton reasoned, if Washington would take the lead in this effort, the results might be less destructive and might ensure the establishment of a federal taxation system that would provide funds, not only for repayment of wartime debts, but also for future need of the government as well.
At this same time, Washington received a letter from Congressman Joseph Jones of Virginia warning him of a conspiracy within the ranks of the army to tear down Washington's reputation so that any opposition he might provide to their plans would be of no consequence. Jones felt the conspiracy had a good chance of succeeding. He did not want to tell Washington what course of action to take, but stated, "Whether to temporize of oppose with steady unremitting firmness... must be left to your own sense of propriety and better judgement".
Washington was astounded and grieved. To think that after all these years of service and sacrifice, with peace so near at hand, that his soldiers would revolt against the very government they had fought to establish! Were the naysayers right? Were republican forms of government only viable on a small scale? Were efforts at popular rule doomed to failure and to result in chaos and anarchy?
Washington spent "many contemplative hours" reviewing the situation in which he was both "citizen and soldier". As a citizen, he wanted to see the establishment of a fair and equitable republic; but as a soldier he knew the army was not being fairly treated and that no peaceful solutions were near at hand. Washington's own investigations made him aware that the situation was serious and that, indeed, his leadership was under attack.
In March, he wrote to Hamilton informing him that he could not condone a movement that would lead to civil unrest and bloodshed. Further, he noted that he would continue on the same steady course and that any conspirators would have to proceed on their own, either confronting him in the conflict they created or ignoring him altogether.
Within the camp at Newburgh, New York, where Washington was stationed with his officers and men, letters began circulating among the soldiers that called for a mass meeting to set forth a plan of action. These letters suggested that Washington was too conciliatory and that such a man who would advocate more forbearance in the face of such mistreatment was not to be trusted.
Washington was determined to persuade the men from taking extreme action. He knew he might fail, but he had to try and reach them. Thus, he called for a meeting on March 15, 1783. Prior to that date, he purposely left the impression that he would not personally attend the meeting. However, he did come to the meeting, entering by a side door, rather than the main entryway. He was visibly agitated. The men, many of whom were surprised at his presence there, were likewise perturbed. Washington presented the speech he had prepared. He reminded them of his own lengthy and devoted service, of the fact that the country they were considering tyrannizing was their own, peopled by their own families on lands they had themselves developed. He continued, " let me entreat you gentlemen, on your part, not to take any measures which, viewed in the clear light of reason, will lessen the dignity and sully the glory you have hitherto maintained: let me request you to rely on the plighted faith of your country, and place a full confidence in the purity of the intentions of Congress". He ended his exhortation with, "you will by the dignity of your conduct, afford occasions for posterity to say, when speaking of the glorious example you have exhibited to mankind, 'had this day been wanting, the world had never seen the last stage of perfection to which human nature is capable of attaining'".
Sensing that his audience was not yet entirely convinced to accept his viewpoint, Washington pulled from his pocket the letter sent to him by Congressman Jones. He wanted to share with the men the good intentions of Congress as set forth by Jones in this letter. He stumbled as he tried to make out the small, close handwriting; he stared helplessly at the paper. The officers leaned forward, fearful of what might have come over their leader. At this moment, Washington paused and pulled out a pair of new spectacles. He said, "Gentlemen, you must pardon me. I have grown gray in your service and now find myself growing blind". The tide was turned! The officers, many of whom were crying, were reminded of Washington's great service and loyalty. They realized that their fate was inextricably linked with his. Surely, if he, who had given so much, could be patient and trust in the eventual good will of the Congress and the states, they could too. The conspiracy was silenced. The men gave a vote of thanks to Washington and asked him to continue to act in their behalf.
Washington
had prevented this infant nation from succumbing to tyranny and civil discord.
Some years later, Jefferson commented, "The moderation and virtue of a
single character probably prevented this Revolution from being closed,
as most others have been, by a subversion of that liberty it was intended
to establish".
REFERENCES
James Thomas Flexner. George Washington, 4-vols. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1965-72; 1-vol abridgement, 1974).
Douglas Southall Freeman. George Washington, 7 vols, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949-1957; vol 7 completed by John A. Carroll and Mary Wells Ashworth; 1-vol. abridgement by Richard Harwell, 1968).
Randall, Willard Stern. George Washington: A Life. Henry Holt and Company, New York. 1997.
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